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ABSTRACT 
The agents’ decisions related to investment, consumption, and other issues are influenced by economics 
conditions. Similarly, in a majority election, voters could decide based on the economic scenario. 
Considering this possibility, two hypotheses were formulated to explain reasons for the decision of the 
voters. The first situation relates to the possibility that the voters choose the option that reduces the 
possibility of loss. This formulation is based on the tendency of loss aversion built by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). The second is reducing the decision-making time; this hypothesis is based on the so-
called shortcuts formulated by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982). These hypotheses were built 
with the theoretical basis of the Theory of Rational Decisions and Behavioral Economics. The 
experiment had the participation of 21 classes and 446 undergraduate students of Economics, 
Management, and Accounting, involving exposure to an economic scenario and two candidates. The 
voters should choose the best choice available. 
 
Keywords: decision-making, behavioral economics, voting, rationality.  
 
RESUMO 
As decisões dos agentes relacionadas a investimento, consumo e outras questões são influenciadas pelas 
condições econômicas. Da mesma forma, em uma eleição majoritária, os eleitores podem decidir com 
base no cenário econômico. Considerando essa possibilidade, foram formuladas duas hipóteses para 
explicar os motivos da decisão dos eleitores. A primeira situação diz respeito à possibilidade de os 
eleitores escolherem a opção que reduz a possibilidade de perda. Esta formulação é baseada na tendência 
de aversão à perda construída por Kahneman e Tversky (1979). O segundo é reduzir o tempo de tomada 
de decisão; essa hipótese é baseada nos chamados atalhos formulados por Kahneman, Slovic e Tversky 
(1982). Essas hipóteses foram construídas com a base teórica da Teoria das Decisões Racionais e da 
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Economia Comportamental. O experimento contou com a participação de 21 turmas e 446 estudantes 
de graduação em Economia, Gestão e Contabilidade, envolvendo exposição a um cenário econômico e 
dois candidatos. Os eleitores devem escolher a melhor opção disponível. 
 
Palavras-chave: tomada de decisão, economia comportamental, votação, racionalidade. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Studies of human decisions over the years have been developing new ways of thinking, creating 
room for academic areas such as Economics, Political Science and Marketing, as well as Psychology, to 
have the opportunity to improve their behavioral practices in analysis of human decisions.  Experimental 
methods are used to arrive to a proper understanding of behavioral analysis, allowing for a full evaluation 
of axioms stemming from economic theories. 
The experimental methods have been developed, improved, and extended in the second half of 
the twentieth century.  One of the precursors of the first experiments in applied behavior studies of 
decision-making agents in economics was Vernon Smith (1962). (DAVIS & HOLT, 1993). Thus, 
experimental studies have gained prominence not only in economics and psychology but also in areas 
that are necessary behavioral information, where there is the need, or the choosing act of an agent for 
something. The area of market intelligence is a good improvement example of experimental methods, 
which has been allocated on a daily basis, in large companies or organizations to verify the acceptance 
of a product or service. 
In the field of Economics, researchers like Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky have conducted 
experiments to evaluate the behavior of agents. Among these studies, there is one by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), which the authors found that individuals are more susceptible to losses than gains. 
Another result was verified in research conducted by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), where it 
was found that the time available for the decision is relevant to the rationality level establishment in the 
decision-making process, and the agents would be more rational in their choice if the time for the 
decision was reduced. 
Behavioral studies are used to support the idea that the human being is predictably irrational 
(ARIELY, 2010) due to choices made every day and to determine the extent of the influence and means 
involved in decision-making analysis. As the agent faces its decision-making process, there are external 
influences which behavioral studies considers: i) the inability to process large amounts of information 
or situations that may require more attention; ii) and there is not always enough time and resources to 
the collection of a complete report, given the limited capacity of human intelligence. 
With these considerations, in order to verify the influence of cognitive biases at the time of 
decision making, in this study using a scenario analysis to decide their votes, it is relevant to assess the 
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basis to how these decisions are made. Furthermore, a question emerges to be investigated: do economic 
scenarios have influence on voters’ decision to choose a presidential candidate? 
Based on these results the following hypotheses were formulated regarding the decision making 
of voters in a majority election when faced with an economic scenario: 
Hypothesis 1 - Voters choose the option that reduces their loss possibilities. 
Hypothesis 2 - When the time given for the decision-making voting process is reduced, the agents 
would be more rational in their choice. 
The objective of this research is to test these two hypotheses with an experimental method 
conducted with undergraduate students. The election scenario was set in different ways and times and 
with different candidates running in the election two by two, as described in detail in section 3. 
Following this introduction, the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, a theoretical 
discussion of the Rationality in Economic Sciences to develop the understanding of the hypotheses; in 
section 3, the described the experiment detail; and in section 4, a discussion of the results followed by 
conclusions. 
 
2 RATIONALITY IN ECONOMICS 
The study of rationality in economics has been discussed for years regarding the choices, in 
general, of economic agents. Robert Frank (1994), in Microeconomics and Behavior, describes that 
rationality implies that people "[...] make decisions according to the cost-benefit criterion [...]". 
(FRANK, 1994, p. 255). The principle of rational choice in the economy "[...] is a certain implicit or 
explicit cost-benefit calculus behind every action, objective and human behavior [...]" (FRANK 1994: 
p. 252), employed to maximize their usefulness. In short, "[...] the rational action is by minimizing the 
middle of the costs in relation to the return of the purposes [...]." (MEIRELES, 2012, p. 54). 
Alfred Marshall (1985), in Principles of Economics, believes that the economy is concerned with 
the side on which man's conduct is more deliberate and such as when weighing the pros and cons of a 
particular stock before taking action. Thus, in all decisions man must perform the analysis of the cost-
effectiveness of their actions. 
The design of the rationality of economic agents strengthened with Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944), consolidating the concept of rational economic behavior in decision-making; the 
authors found that based on the axiom of the rationality of decision makers, that the markets could not 
be foreseen or behave irrationally. The assumption for the decision maker is the idea "that their decision 
values and experience values coincide; starting from the concept of a decision maker designed that is 
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able to predict future experiences with perfect accuracy and thus evaluate the existing options." 
(KAHNEMAN e TVERSKY, 1982, p. 349). 
 
2.1 BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
  Behavioral Economics (EC) has been developing over the years as an alternative approach to the 
rational model of decision-making accepted by the traditional economy. It emerged as a critic to the 
traditional way which the decisions of agents are formulated by making a careful analysis of the cost-
benefit, with a maximization of satisfaction, and of the assumption that a person's thinking ability is 
unlimited. The critics to the rational decision-making model have intensified since the second half of the 
twentieth century with the work of authors such as Herbert Simon (1972) and Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). The contrary view arose in order to suggest that people do not always behave rationally, 
maximizing their satisfaction. For example, they have different behavior when they lose a movie ticket 
for a value of $ X or lose money of the same value $ X. (KAHNEMAN, 2011).                                    
 Herbert Simon (1947) considers that the analysis of a decision should be made with limits to 
behavioral options and their consequences. Decision makers do the best they can, given the limits of 
their cognitive ability to choose. In this way, the author argues that the decision makers have limitations 
on their skills in processing and analyzing information. In addition, in order to facilitate agents’ decision-
making, they frequently use shortcuts, also known as heuristics.                                  
 Behavioral Economics considers that agents are influenced by emotions, they have certain 
preferences, and the choice of a good or service is not always made in a rational way. Human beings do 
not act in order to analyze all costs in a given situation to maximize their usefulness, which would occur 
by doing the analysis of the decision scenario, seeking what might bring the greatest profit and 
disregarding what would not, because they want to avoid future loss.     
 However, as pointed out previously, decisions are susceptible to biases that ultimately lead the 
agents to make faster decisions and that require less effort of them, as humans are often exposed to 
influences that can undermine their ability to judge and act clearly. (KAHNEMAN, 2011).                                               
 Since rationality is considered by many as difficult to achieve, it is something desirable for 
decision making agents. However, it is not what necessarily occurs because the use of a calculation by 
the decision-maker suggests a longer reasoning. The consideration of the risks of decisions not only in 
short term but also medium and long term can generate nuisance to the mind, because agents are 
constantly pressed with time to accomplish a choice. This leads them to decide the easiest and most 
attractive options, and these can often become something like a trap and bring an unexpected result.  
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In order to demonstrate the techniques needed for the preparation of the experiment carried out 
in this paper, the next section approaches the development of the experimental method in the field of 
economics and political science. 
2.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS METHOD 
 The development of an economic experiment is not only a test on any location, it requires control. 
Economics tests are more controlled and come from different rules for their implementation in order for 
the final result to be nearest to the truth. According to Davis and Holt (1993), for the experiment to 
become valid the environment and the procedure should be standardized for all sessions; and each 
session must have detailed instructions allowing the participating agents to perform the experiment 
without feeling cheated or fed with false hopes, because if it does, the procedure is not seen as credible. 
These specifications are one of the main differences in data collection through economic experimental 
analysis and a research opinion, for example. 
It is noteworthy, that the experimental research method in the economics field has intensified 
over the years, seeking to unravel the axioms presented by economic theories and looking for 
improvements applicable to the methodologies of studies supported by its theories.         
 Usually, the researchers developing these procedures choose the element to be applied to the 
experimental method, checking what is the best for achieving their goals. Douglas Davis and Charles 
Holt (1993) consider that there are three objectives,: i) The Behavioral Hypothesis Test, in the way to 
build a lab environment that meets the structural hypothesis particular theory, is given the best possible 
chance to test its behavioral implications, using fake method; ii) The Theory of Stress Testing, performs 
the exam of sensitivity of a theory to violations of certain assumptions; iii) The search for Empirical 
Regularities refers to the type of experiments that seek to document unexpected regularities in the 
relationship between certain economics variables. (DAVIS & HOLT, 1993).      
  The procedure used in this paper is the behavioral hypothesis, one of the most used methods; it 
can be applied to sessions that aim to confirm the existence of certain phenomena or experiments aimed 
to test theoretical explanations of phenomena. (FLORES, 2012).  
2.2.1 Economics experiments applied in political science  
In recent years, the number and prevalence of experimental studies focused on issues of political 
process have grown rapidly, influenced by researchers engaging this field of knowledge as a way to use 
experimental techniques to unravel political phenomena. The growing interest in experiments is due to 
their usefulness in facilitating conclusions through procedures with participants in treatment 
(manipulation of prices, for example) or control groups (which are not exposed to the treatment). In its 
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entirety, the experiments can generate empirical claims, having the ability to change or open a new range 
of information about existing academic studies. (DRUKMAN, GREEN, KUKLINSKI & LUPIA, 2011). 
     The first experiments in the field of political science were identified after 1940, and the first 
experimental work was written by Samuel Eldersveld and published in American Political Science 
Review (APSR) in 1956. In this study, the author distributed randomly potential voters: control groups 
that received no message, or the treatment groups receiving messages encouraging them to vote through 
personal contact (which included phone calls or personal visits) or through correspondence. The study 
showed that there was a greater involvement of people who were in treatment groups (through personal 
contact), than of any control group or the correspondence group; the obtained results showed that 
personal contact caused a relative increase in the participation rate of users. (DRUKMAN, GREEN, 
KUKLINSKI & LUPIA, 2011). Using the decision-making as a basis in an election, it should be 
considered that the alternatives are already pre-determined, clear, and limited in number. These 
alternatives, which are the candidates, would strive to get the votes from the voters, making clear what 
they are thinking and doing in an attempt to avoid any doubt at the time that the decision must be made, 
even if there are different agents with diversity of political knowledge and experience in their ability to 
process political information. (LAU & LEVY, 1998).  
In the economics field, the rational choice approach assumes that voters and candidates decide 
on a policy position among a set of alternatives based on rational calculation of self-interest; voters will 
calculate their preferences based on the attributes of each candidate, considering that the final decision 
is a rational choice to maximize their cost-benefit. (LAU & LEVY, 1998, p.32).    
 However, the researchers Richard Lau and Jack Levy (1998) consider that the rational decision 
model is outdated, especially by not considering that the human being has a limited cognitive capacity 
and that in its decisions, such as voting in an election, they are using heuristics. In addition, it should be 
considered that the vote can be influenced by family preferences, in a way that the voters end up deciding 
according to the preferences of their families without further trials of these decisions.  
 With the development of studies on heuristics - shortcuts - for decision-making (KAHNEMAN, 
SLOVIC & TVERSKY, 1982), the attempt to understand the decision process that cause these 
systematic deviations from the rational model and to evaluate the relative effectiveness of various 
cognitive heuristics is a big challenge for researchers of the political and economic area. In th context of 
the decision, "we must not only be concerned with the general standards of behavior but also the specific 
context in which the choices are made." (LAU & LEVY, 1998, p. 31).    
 The authors David Redlawsk & Richard Lau (2012) consider as determinants of the decision: i) 
the number of candidates - the decision is easier when there are only two candidates; ii) the similarity of 
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the candidate alternatives, that is, the more similar are their electoral proposals the more difficult to pick 
one candidate; iii) the time allowed for choosing, for a short time can press the final decision; and iv) 
the way the information is presented, as “[...] information rarely becomes available in an orderly, 
controllable manner, especially in the context of political decisions [...]". (REDLAWSK & LAU, 2012, 
p. 27). It appears then, that given the development of the experimental economic field in recent years, 
political scientists have joined the experiments performed in the laboratory with the goal to get better 
data collection and thus better understand "how" decisions are made by voters in an election.  
 In search for an ideal approach to the voting decision, Richard Lau & David Redlawsk (1997), 
in Voting Correctly, held an experiment in 1994 with about 300 people involving the verification of vote 
right in presidential elections. As it is difficult to set a good candidate for all, the beginning of the 
experiment predetermined "correct" choices based on the values and beliefs of each voter, and not on a 
particular ideology that assumes the values and preferences that a particular class must have. However, 
strictly based on full information conditions on the candidates, and for general information purposes 
about 70% of the participants held the vote considered correct. (LAU & REDLAWSK, 1997).  
 After the experiment of Richard Lau & David Redlawsk, seeking a wider line on the perception 
of a voter on the economy, researchers Daniel Hopkins & Lindsay Pettingill (2015) conducted an 
analysis of the decisions of voters in local elections, considering the performance of the local economy 
as the basis for the decision of the vote. When elections were for national or state levels, a massive 
amount of information was available regarding the country or state economy, which arrived through the 
media, but in local elections, the media minimally addressed these issues. One of the results showed that 
voters when they had no economic information mostly used his personal finances to identify the vote 
that they would consider correct. (HOPKINS & PETTINGILL, 2015).  After these studies, it 
was possible to verify the relevance of the experimental method to understand more clearly how voters' 
decisions are formed. The increasing use of experimental tools has opened a new range of opportunities 
for different areas of study beyond economics.        
 Still, through the studies of Simon (1978), Kahneman & Tversky (1979), new influences began 
to emerge and the Theory of Behavioral Decision comes up with a new vision of choice. Heuristics are 
considered shortcuts that people use to make a decision (LAU, ANDERSEN & REDLAWSK, 2008) 
leading to new questions regarding the Theory of Rational Choice and its actual evidence in the 
experimental field. 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 The analysis of this research is based on an experiment conducted with 446 undergraduate 
students of the School of Management and Business of a University, aiming to understand the aspects 
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related to the behavior of voters in deciding between two candidates running for an election presented 
as presidential candidates. The sample consisted of undergraduate students as voters and as candidates, 
with chosen candidates’ people of good verbal communication skills so that information could clearly 
be transmitted to participants. (LIMA, GOSLING & MATOS, 2008). 
 
3.1 SELECTION PROCESS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS   
After the authorization of the university's ethics committee for the experiment, the selection 
criteria for the participants were: a) be 18 years or more; b) be an undergraduate student in the School 
of Business Management at the University; c) have the subject teacher's consent to the experiment with 
their students. After completing these questions, the student's participation can only become valid with 
his signature on the Term of Consent Clear and Clarified of the Experiment. 
3.1.1 Voters  
Voters should be undergraduate students of the School of Management and Business at the 
University. The students were consulted in the classroom through a prior authorization from the 
coordination course that the student belonged to the subject teacher. Furthermore, the longer economic 
experiment took 25 minutes. 
3.1.2 Candidates  
The candidates should be students of the faculty of economics, being called candidate A (Ca) and 
candidate B (Cb). The choice of these candidates were based on two different profiles set. These 
candidates were pre-selected with support and indication of the coordination of undergraduate and 
graduate college of economics and the academic course of that directory. After this preselection, an 
interview with them to check the availability of part of the experiment was performed. 
 
3.2 ELECTORAL PROCESSES 
The electoral processes had the objective to apply different procedures in order to test if a change 
in any procedure could produce some variation in the results. Altogether three different processes were 
applied on a total of 446 students. More information about the time of implementation and results 
obtained in each class can be found in Appendix B. 
3.2.1 General description of objects       
Economic Scenario: It is the description of the current situation in the country. The information was 
distributed in printed way to the students in each procedure. In the scenario the following data variables 
were considered annually: GDP growth rate, the percentage of public debt to GDP, the basic interest 
rate, inflation, exchange rate and unemployment rate.                                               
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Candidate Proposition: It consists of two distinct economics policies on which each candidate stands 
to be elected as president.                            
Session: Location where the experiment was performed, as each group of voters consists of a separate 
session. 
3.2.2 Description of the voting process  
 Three different procedures in these electoral processes were administered: 
• Procedure 1: The purpose of the experiment was presented to participants, the Term of 
Consent Clear and Clarified of the Experiment (TCCE) distributed for signature and after 
signing, with the participants interested in participating in the experiment, an analysis of the 
economic scenario was shown and the two candidates presented their proposals, each with a 
maximum of two minutes of defense, and after that the voting process was held.  
      
• Procedure 2: The purpose of the experiment was presented to participants, the Term of 
Consent Clear and Clarified of the Experiment (TCCE) distributed for signature and after 
signing, with the participants interested in participating in the experiment, an analysis of the 
economic scenario was shown and the two candidates presented their proposals, each with a 
maximum of two minutes of defense. After that, the participants were allowed to talk with 
each other for one minute about the two candidates with the other classmates, but they should 
not ask questions to the candidates and after that the voting process was held. 
• Procedure 3: The purpose of the experiment was presented to participants, the Term of 
Consent Clear and Clarified of the Experiment (TCCE) distributed for signature and after 
signing, with the participants interested in participating in the experiment, an analysis of the 
economic scenario was shown and the two candidates presented their proposals, each with a 
maximum of two minutes of defense. After that the following procedure was equal to 
procedure 2, however, in addition to the voters talking with each other, they could also talk 
with the candidates, and after that the voting process was held. 
These different formats intended to verify that with the changes in the patterns of the electoral 
process the final results of the procedures would have some variation. Thus, the first had a limitation to 
the voters, only proposals without the possibility of dialogue with the candidates, allowing only 
information of one side and could leave voters with questions for the choice making of the chosen 
candidate. The second allowed voters to interact with the other participants about their opinions 
regarding the proposals of each candidate, and the issue of communication as a tool for their decision. 
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In addition, the third case allowed an extra layer of information input with questions directed either to 
other participants as to the candidates. 
 
4 RESULTS ANALYSES 
 There were 21 elections processes, one in each different discipline, which involved 446 students, 
divided in majors as Business, Economics and Accounting. This number was higher than expected (300), 
which allows for a more systematic evaluation of the data in terms of the stability of the results and for 
the ability to perform some generalizations. 
Of these 21, the first group, considered the pilot, was excluded from the analysis since it would 
be based only to improve other experiments in other classes. It should be noted that the candidates chosen 
for a session were not colleagues of the others in that discipline; the TCCE presentation was read in 
conjunction with the participants and they were asked if they had doubts and if they understood the 
purpose of the experiment. As the economic scenario, it was emphasized that the scenario was fictitious 
and the country in question was fictitious, in order to not confuse the participants in incorporating the 
information in the economic scenario as being of their own country. 
In conducting the 21 experiments, among the ten candidates who participated in the sessions, six 
candidates were female, and four candidates were male. Three of these were Master Economics students 
and seven were students of the Economics undergraduate program. It is important to note that the 
"candidates" stand for different political platforms. 
One candidate represented the Proposition 1, an optimistic proposal that focuses on the short 
term by emphasizing state spending. The other candidate, representing Proposition 2, considers 
economic constraints, establishing the need for adjustments in the economy so that in the medium term, 
the economy is expected to grow. To avoid gender or charisma in the decision of the vote, the 
experiments were conducted only with candidate male or female and the candidates were changed in 
terms of proposals in different classes. During the voting process, it was possible to verify that candidates 
could convey concisely their respective roles, did not grow insecure at any time or struggle to express 
themselves. 
The sessions progressed in sequence, with three different procedures, such as the procedure 1, in 
which the students could not question the candidates and not talk to each other; Procedure 2, in which 
the students could talk to each other and then vote and the Procedure 3, in which students could talk to 
each other and question the candidates regarding their proposals. These different methods had been 
established with the aim to test different forms of voting, looking to find out if changes in the final tallies 
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would correlate with the facilitation a higher level of communication (HOPKINS & PETTINGILL, 
2015) among voters. 
It was stipulated also that the correct/rational vote (LAU & REDLAWSK, 1997), after the 
analysis of the economic scenario, was for the participants to take the Proposition 2, even though it was 
a policy with short-term adjustments, the medium term aimed to aid the country's growth. It was made 
clear that this proposition was chosen as the most rational due to forecasts of economic indicators for 
the next four years, requiring harsh measures of spending restraint, to resume growth. 
  
4.1 ECONOMIC SCENARIO [APPENDIX A]  
The vote caused by loss aversion would take place by majority vote on Proposition 1, because it 
guarantees the generation of employment to population, higher incomes and government intervention in 
the economy and continued growth despite the economic scenario being shown otherwise in their 
predictions. 
The objective in doing these experiments with students of the School of Management and 
Business at the University was to investigate the participants’ knowledge in comprehending the 
economic scenarios, it is understood that they would have the ability to understand and interpret the 
economic indicators exposed. 
 
4.2 RESULT OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
One of the hypotheses employed in this experiment was the loss aversion (KAHNEMAN & 
TVERSKY, 1979), which supports the assertion that individuals are more sensitive to losses than to 
gains. The loss (in Proposition 2 case) would result in a higher refusal of the students, because the short 
term would require tight control of public spending and investment only in effective demand sectors of 
the economy and would not fight unemployment in other sectors that were passing through difficulties, 
due to demand nurtured in times of incentives for consumption. This would consequently generate a 
budget constraint for people engaged in sectors where layoffs were taking place, requiring that these 
people could be placed in the medium term in other companies that would generate productivity and 
facilitate the economic development of the country. 
It was expected that the Proposition 1, the optimist, would be the winner as grounded in the 
introduction. The candidate of the proposal advocated the need for greater performance of the 
government in the economy, which is the main credit facilitator for people with ways to stimulate 
economic production and employment generation. 
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However, the Proposition 2 was the one that had the highest number of votes, with 52.65% of 
the total votes. As the Proposition 2, the candidates point out the economic data, emphasizing that the 
scenario was not favorable, would require short-term adjustments, and the benefits of this policy would 
only be felt in the medium and long term; therefore, it was expected that voters would refute this choice. 
Therefore, these results go against loss aversion (KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY, 1979) which tell 
us that people are more sensitive to losses than to gains, applied to the experiment carried out, the loss 
giving would be the proposition of economic restrictions, rather than the pessimistic choice. Considering 
that it would, at first, bring a cut to the government spending and a reassessment of economic measures, 
bringing some losses in a short term to the society. 
Nevertheless, the choice accepted as a tendency to loss aversion, would be the choice of 
participants for Proposition 1, which in the short term promised facilitation of credit as a means of 
generating new jobs and economic development, even with forecasts being pessimistic about the 
economic scenario. The checks of the data obtained from the descriptive statistics of the results are 
shown in Table 1. 
 . 
Table 1 - Descriptive statistic of the results on the economics experiments 
Variable Observations Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Sample 20 21.7 11.2 3.0 42.0 
Proposition 1 20 9.4 7.3 2.0 28.0 
Proposition 2 20 12.1 8.8 1.0 34.0 
Duration of section (min.) 20 16.4 4.2 10.0 25.0 
Economic class 20 0.3 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Candidate gender 
(feminine) 20 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Null 20 0.2 0.5 0.0 2.0 
Source: Elaborate by the author, data from the experiments. Using Stata. 
 
 
When analyzing the data collected and separating them by procedure model performed, the 
results of the procedure 1 show that 53.73% of voters opted for the proposition 2. Although it is noted 
that this procedure was the fastest and did not let the voters communicate with each other before the vote 
decision. A possible explanation for this result would be that voters usually make better decisions with 
little information, therefore this conclusion goes against the theory of rational decisions (REDLAWSK 
& LAU, 2012). But using the assumption of heuristics or shortcuts (KAHNEMAN, SLOVIC & 
TVERSKY, 1982) for quick decision making, it had supported the conclusion that people can make 
better decisions in a short time of their evaluation (LAU & REDLAWSK , 2006). 
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For the results of votes of procedure 2, it was found that the majority of voters, 53.88% voted for 
the proposition 1; this procedure allowed people to talk to each other to reach a conclusion before the 
vote. Therefore, the presence of group thought (KOERBER & NECK, 2003) suggests that there is a 
failure to assess the risk of a selected alternative, and it may restrict critical thinking of the group 
members, in a way that the easiest options are the preferred. In the case of experiment choices of this 
paper, the easiest option to be chosen without risk analysis of economic scenarios was the proposition 
1. 
However, taking into account the procedure 3 results (62.41% - for the proposition 2), it is clear 
that the greater is the information that the voter has from the candidates themselves, the choice can 
become more critical. With this procedure the participants have the opportunity to communicate with 
each other and they could question the candidates. When there is acquisition of complete information to 
the decision-makers - through communication among the group and the questioning of the candidates – 
it is posited that cognitive deviation is minimized due to information being processed in a more 
controlled way. The questions and doubts are resolved directly with the candidates and not left only 
within the group (REDLAWSK & LAU, 2012), avoiding information confusion. 
From this data overview, in the next section, the levels of reliability and stability of the results 
are addressed for a better understanding on a statistical level. 
 
4.3 STATISTICAL RESULTS VERIFICATION 
According to the evaluations carried out on the previous sections, the data was collected from 
the 20 classes and 434 students. Speculating to expand the results to find a generalization, based on the 
stability of the results, it shall not represent at 5% of significance that the result would remain if the 
sample was changed. This occurs because the study did not use the entire population to fully trust the 
results and needed to estimate the confidence interval of 95%.   
The results show that the proposition 1, with the result of 46.31% being a central measure, has a 
margin for the confidence interval not above 56.47% and not below 36.15%. The same goes for 
proposition 2, with the center measure of 52.65% and its minimum and maximum respectively, 42.36% 
and 62.94%. These data show that there is the possibility of cross values which could lead to a reversal 
of the winning choice or even a tie.         
For the analysis of the dependency ratio of a variable related to another, it was estimated in the 
matrix correlation between the main experiment data. The results are shown in table 2. 
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Table 2 - Matrix correlation of the main values of the sample  
  
Source: Elaborate by the author, data from the experiments. 
 
Consider: 
Dura_min:  Duration of the experiment in minutes. 
Sample: Quantity of participants of the experiments.  
n Pa1:  Quantity of participants that voted in proposition 1.     
(%) Proposition 1: Average of participants that voted in the proposition 1.  
n Pa2: Quantity of participants that voted in proposition 2.  
(%) Proposition 2: Average of participants that voted in the proposition 2.  
n Null: Quantity of participants that voted null. 
(%) Null: Average of participants that voted null. 
 
 Analyzing the data above, the level of strong positive correlation between the size of the sample 
and duration of the experiment can be observed (0.7941), indicating that most of the pairs of values of 
the variables are located near a line with a positive slope. 
It is important to note that the time analyzed includes the participants’ explanation period of the 
experiments and the signature of the Term of Consent Clear and Clarified of the Experiment (TCCE). 
As there were experiments with a large number of people, the number of participants affected the time 
of the experiments’ realization, due to a longer period of session explanation about the purpose of the 
experiment and the voting method. It should also take into account the different procedures performed; 
there was the procedure 1 (with no possibility of communication between participants), procedure 2 
(with only communication between colleagues) and procedure 3 (with communication between 
participants and candidates), with the latter taking a longer time in all classes. 
Although, even with the time difference of the experiments between the classes, the time required 
from the start of the candidates’ speech has not been altered in any class. All students were given the 
same time to analyze the candidates’ proposals and depending on the procedure, the same time 
communication between colleagues or between colleagues and candidates. 
Dura_mi
n Sample n Pa1
(%) 
Propositi
on 1 n Pa2
(%) 
Propositi
on 2 n Null (%) Null
Dura_min 1,0000
Sample 0,7941 1,0000
n Pa1 0,4702 0,6329 1,0000
(%) Proposition 1 -0,2622 -0,2803 0,5051 1,0000
n Pa2 0,6360 0,7613 -0,0180 -0,7795 1,0000
(%) Proposition 2 0,2753 0,2875 -0,4992 -0,9914 0,7915 1,0000
n Null -0,1334 -0,0698 0,0333 0,0550 -0,1764 -0,1841 1,0000
(%) Null -0,1257 -0,0822 0,0049 0,0328 -0,1682 -0,1634 0,9905 1,0000
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Aiming to analyze the t-test for averages, the data was estimated regarding the average of the 
results of proposition 1 and the average of the results of proposition 2, as can be verified on Table 3. 
 
Table 3 - T test for the experiments   
 
Source: Elaborate by the author, data from the experiments. 
 
In the t-test of the average for the experiments without distributing them by gender, it was found 
that there is no average difference as p-value resulted in 0.365, i.e., it accepts the null hypothesis of H0 
= the average being equal. 
Following this, a t-test of the average related to the gender of candidates was conducted 
considering the hypothesis H0 = averages are equal and H1 = averages are different.  In table 4 were 
checked the values of t-test for the averages of the experiments with female candidates. 
 
 
Table 4 - T test for the experiments with female candidates 
 
Source: Elaborate by the author, data from the experiments. 
  
 
As p-value equals 0.597, it was rejected the hypothesis of H1, that is, there is no difference of 
averages. In addition, by analyzing the data from the results of the sections with women as candidates, 
it was found that the majority of votes, 51.26% went to the candidate who was defending the proposition 
Proposition 1 Proposition 2
Average 46,3134799 52,648285
Variance 471,220462 483,62807
Comments 20 20
Average difference Hypothesis 0
gl 38
Stat t -0,9168135
P (T <= t) one-tailed 0,1825113
t Critical one-tailed 1,68595446
P (T <= t) two-tailed 0,3650226
t critical two-tailed 2,02439415
Proposition 1 Proposition 2
Average 51,26196 47,1407547
Variance 384,62839 386,180765
Comments 13 13
Average difference Hypothesis 0
gl 24
Stat t 0,5352079
P (T <= t) one-tailed 0,2987154
t Critical one-tailed 1,7108821
P (T <= t) two-tailed 0,5974309
t critical two-tailed 2,0638985
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1. One possible explanation of such results would be the study of decisions between candidates of 
different genders (CARLI, 200; RUDMAN & GLICK, 2001) which claim that people show more 
receptiveness to female gender when a woman shows favorable information. It is represented as a 
collaborative person who wants to help others without expressing any negative information; and the 
reverse are shown to women who tend to show negative information that somehow threatens the welfare 
of the voter (CARLI, 200; RUDMAN & Glick , 2001). In one of the classes in which the procedure 2 
was performed, with female candidates, it was noticed that there was some objection from participants 
in voting on proposition 2, because the candidate who defended it turned out to be quite pessimistic, and 
did not offer much positive information. 
The t-test of the average related with the male candidates, the values obtained are shown in Table 
5. 
 
Table 5 - T test for the experiments with male candidates 
 
Source: Elaborate by the author, data from the experiments. 
 
 
The t-test for the experiments average with male candidates, resulted in a p-value equal to 0.0667. 
Therefore the hypothesis was rejected of averages being equal (H0), with significantly different results 
at 95% confidence. It shows a majority of votes, 62.88%, were for the candidate who was defending 
proposition 2. This result reveals that information deemed bad or in some way threatening to the voter 
welfare are better resembled with the male figure (CARLI, 2001). 
Through studies regarding communication between the gender difference (CARLI, 200; 
RUDMAN & GLICK, 2001), it shows that optimistic proposals when submitted by women, have a 
higher acceptability than a negative or pessimistic proposition. The female is seen as a symbol of 
comforting news and not otherwise. However, the propositions presented by males have no degree of 
differentiation; the voter generally had received both negative and positive information and had analyzed 
it the same way. It can also be said that in the eyes of the voter when candidates are male, the level of 
analysis ends up being more rational.  
Proposition 1 Proposition 2
Average 37,123445 62,8765549
Variance 571,35233 571,352332
Comments 7 7
Average difference Hypothesis 0
gl 12
Stat t -2,015634
P (T <= t) one-tailed 0,0333978
t Critical one-tailed 1,7822875
P (T <= t) two-tailed 0,0667957
t critical two-tailed 2,1788128
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To test that assumption, it was estimated a simple OLS -Ordinary Least Square Regression 
considering the dependent variable the proposition 1 and considering the duration of the section, the 
candidate gender and if the class is from students of the economic department.  
 
Table 6 - OLS Estimation for Proposition 1 Determinants 
Dependent variable: 
Proposition 1 Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
            
Duration of section (min.) 1.085 0.371 2.930 0.010 0.299 1.870 
Candidate gender (feminine) 6.273 3.220 1.950 0.069 -0.553 13.099 
Economic class -0.342 3.303 -0.100 0.919 -7.343 6.660 
constant -12.378 7.329 -1.690 0.111 -27.914 3.158 
Source: Estimated with Stata. R-square= 0.371 and Adjusted R-squared= 0.253. 
 
 As represented in table 6, the candidate being a female gender impact positively in the choice of 
Proposition 1. The duration of the experiment also is statistically significant with p-value less than 0.10 
and impacting positively in the Proposition 1. However, the economic students negative impact in the 
choice of preposition 1, is not statistically significant. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
Through the results, it was possible to test the hypothesis of loss aversion (KAHNEMAN & 
TVERSKY, 1979), which specifies that people are more susceptible to losses than to gains, in the case 
of the experiment the loss would occur by the choice of the proposition 2 (pessimistic). This choice 
defended that the scenario was not favorable and required short-term adjustments and the benefits of this 
policy only would be felt in the medium and long term, so it was expected that voters would refute this 
choice. However, this proposal had the highest concentration of votes, and it can be seen that in most 
cases, the students used the rational model of decision-making and effectively voted in order to choose 
the most rational choice. 
In the same way, the second hypothesis related to shortcuts (KAHNEMAN, SLOVIC & 
TVERSKY, 1982) for decision making was considered, which holds that people are more critical in a 
short time assessment of a decision (LAU & REDLAWSK, 2006). Already, based on the procedure 3, 
it was found that the higher the level of communication between voters and candidates, there is a greater 
chance of people making more rational decisions and positioning themselves better critically about the 
data presented to them.  
However, considering procedure 2 results, it was found that when people have more time for 
communications and group chat (KOERBER & NECK, 2003) on the best offer, there is a possibility of 
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systemic errors, i.e. there is a failure to assess the risk of a selected alternative, and may also restrict the 
critical thinking of the group members, such that the easiest options are the preferred. 
When the data obtained by the gender of the candidates is explored, there was a difference in the 
results, with proposition 1 being more accepted when held by a female candidate, supporting the 
assumption that information from the females are better accepted when they are optimistic (CARLI, 200; 
RUDMAN & GLICK, 2001) about a certain situation. Nevertheless, when the results of the choices with 
males candidates are considered, there was a higher level of critical analysis between the groups, so this 
may point out that voters analyzed more rationally the economic scenarios and the propositions. 
However, when considering only the behavior of the groups in the experiment, when there was 
the opportunity of questioning the candidates (procedure 3) not all groups questioned the candidates, 
running counter to the Theory of Rational Decisions which maintains that the decision makers will 
always look for relevant information before deciding for something (REDLAWSK & LAU, 2012). The 
fact that this ability for group questioning in an experiment went unutilized indicates that the agents do 
not always seek to better understand the subject or seek answers to some questions before making a 
decision. 
Due to the foregoing, even if the sample of participants were higher than estimated initially, at 
300 students, acquiring a more informed development of data would require a longer time for analysis 
and further carrying out the experiments, as the sessions were held in about a month, with different 
volunteering candidates. A longer period of time and planning is required for a higher concentration of 
the sample and analysis of the results, such as the need for greater uniformity of candidates, and even 
though the candidates were for the economy graduate course, they were also from different academic 
levels. 
It should be noted that for suggestions for further work, research with students from different 
undergraduate courses would be interesting, not eschewing only courses that can have an analysis 
through its disciplines of economic indicators. It would be interesting to perform a study with sciences 
and technology courses. Furthermore, looking outside of the academic institutional context, it would be 
possible to carry out the experiments with people of a lower education level and check for variation in 
results.  Another possibility would be an analysis with high school students, using the sessions for 
economic discussions by teachers. Due to the experiments made, it was observed that some of the 
concepts were seen by participants only in college and in high school and that the studying of these 
concepts were fundamental to the basis of creating a critical position of decision maker agents. 
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1 Appendix A            Figure 1. 
Economic Scenario 
 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
GPD Growth % 2,46 2,83 1,8 1,5 0,7 0 0,5 -0,8 0,6
% Public debt related 
with GPD 65 64,5 64,6 64,8 64,9 64,8 65,2 65,5 65,7
Inflation Rate % 3,1 4,46 5,9 4,31 5,91 6,5 5,8 5,9 6,5
Exchange Rate $ 2,3 2,4 2,5 2,7 3,2 3,31 3,45 3,49 3,59
Unemployment Rate % 5,4 5,5 6 6,8 7,3 9,1 7,8 8,9 9,2
Basic Tax Rate % 13,6 11,1 13,6 11,75 14,25 13 12,5 11,25 11,75
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1 Appendix B                                     
Table 7. Experiments Conducted 
 
Continuation 
N° Date Class
Dura_m
in Proce Gen
Prop 
1 
Prop 
2 Sample n Pa1
perc_par
t1 n Pa2
perc_par
t2 Null (%) Null
1* 03/09/2015 Microeconomics II 20 P3 M Ca Cb 12 3 25,000 9 75,000 0 0,000
2 14/09/2015 Market economy 15 P1 M Ca Cb 36 2 5,556 34 94,444 0 0,000
3** 15/09/2015
Economy / 
Financial 
Management 10 P1 M Cb Ca 3 2 66,667 1 33,333 0 0,000
4 15/09/2015
History of 
Economic 
Thinking 20 P3 M Cb Ca 23 12 52,174 11 47,826 0 0,000
5 16/09/2015
Process 
management 20 P1 F Ca Cb 36 24 66,667 12 33,333 0 0,000
6 17/09/2015
Technical 
Research in 
Economics 12 P2 F Cb Ca 9 7 77,778 2 22,222 0 0,000
7 17/09/2015
Research Tools in 
Economics 15 P2 F Cb Ca 17 8 47,059 7 41,176 2 11,765
8 23/09/2015 Social accounting 15 P3 F Ca Cb 17 9 52,941 8 47,059 0 0,000
9 23/09/2015
Economic 
Scenario Analysis 19 P2 F Ca Cb 30 9 30,000 21 70,000 0 0,000
10 28/09/2015
Economic 
Scenario Analysis 20 P2 F Cb Ca 42 28 66,667 14 33,333 0 0,000
11 01/10/2015 Statistics 16 P2 F Cb Ca 21 5 23,810 16 76,190 0 0,000
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Source: Elaborated by the author.  
 
12 05/10/2015 Economy II 20 P3 M Cb Ca 28 8 28,571 20 71,429 0 0,000
13 06/10/2015 Accounting I 15 P1 M Cb Ca 19 10 52,632 9 47,368 0 0,000
14 06/10/2015
Administrative 
Process 
Fundamentals 25 P3 M Cb Ca 29 2 6,897 27 93,103 0 0,000
15 06/10/2015
Process 
management 25 P3 M Cb Ca 38 18 47,368 20 52,632 0 0,000
16 07/10/2015
International 
accounting 12 P1 F Ca Cb 15 4 26,667 11 73,333 0 0,000
17 07/10/2015 Applied statistics 15 P1 F Ca Cb 25 17 68,000 7 28,000 1 4,000
18 07/10/2015
Administrative 
Process 
Fundamentals 15 P1 F Cb Ca 20 7 35,000 12 60,000 1 5,000
19 09/10/2015
Costs and budget 
in decision-
making 12 P2 F Cb Ca 10 5 50,000 5 50,000 0 0,000
20 09/10/2015
Economic 
Statistics 15 P2 F Cb Ca 11 9 81,818 2 18,182 0 0,000
21 09/10/2015
Asset Portfolio 
Management 12 P1 F Cb Ca 5 2 40,000 3 60,000 0 0,000
